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Listed Companies on the Ghana Stock Exchange 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose - This paper seeks to examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance of 
listed Ghanaian companies. 
Design/Methodology/approach – The study adopts a longitudinal and cross-sectional data set of 20 sampled 
companies over a period of 5 years. The data was analysed using a panel regression and ANOVA analysis to 
establish the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Corporate governance is defined 
in terms of three indices –board structure, ownership structure and corporate control while firm performance is 
measured by return on assets, return on equity, net profit margin and Tobin’s Q. 
Findings - The findings of the study revealed that, top twenty ownership structures and female representation on 
board have significant positive relationship with firm performance, while board independence and frequency of 
audit committee meeting have negative significant relationship with firm performance. 
 
Research limitations/implications – The scope of this study can be expanded to include non-listed firms. 
In addition, other corporate governance mechanisms could be considered to broaden the scope of the study. 
Originality/value -The originality of the paper is attributable to the use of two (2) data analysis techniques 
(panel regression analysis and ANOVA) which provides a comprehensive analysis on the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. This, to the best knowledge of the authors, is the first of its kind to 
be done in Ghana. 
Keywords - Corporate governance, board of directors, ownership structure, corporate control, firm 
performance, Ghana. 
Paper type - Research paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
It is evidence that Good corporate governance provides the ability to improve competitive 
advantage, efficiency and effectiveness of companies (Maher and Anderson, 1999). As a 
result, stakeholders have begun to realise the importance of good corporate governance 
practices in protecting their interests. The empirical work on corporate governance and its 
impact on firm performance has growing remarkably in recent years especially in developing 
countries. There are little research has looked at corporate governance in developing 
countries such as Ghana.  Previous studies also provide mixed findings on the directions of 
causality between corporate governance and firm performance. In this context, this paper 
attempt to examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in 
Ghana. The Ghanaian business environment is characterised by a good level of growth and 
further growth is expected because of the recent discovery of oil in the country. This has 
resulted in the increased awareness of the effects of corporate governance on the performance 
of firms in Ghana.  The study adopts a longitudinal and cross-sectional data set of 20 sampled 
companies over a period of 5 years. Our findings are useful for the policy community who 
are concerned with the impact of governance structure on corporate disclosure. 
 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of prior 
literature, which explore the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance, and development of hypothesis. Section 3 presents our research design. The 
main results are discussed in section 4, and we provide a summary of our results and 
conclusion in section 5. 
 
 
Background of Ghana 
 
Ghana, a developing country located in the West African Sub region is categorised amongst 
countries often faced with poor economic performance, weak legal and regulatory 
frameworks, illiquid stock markets and very frequent market intervention by government 
agencies (Tsamenyi et al, 2007). These structural characteristics have led to the demand for 
good corporate governance in Ghana and similar countries (Ahunwan 2002). Ghana does not 
have a specific corporate governance code such as the United Kingdom (principles based) 
and the United States (rules based). This means that companies tend to operate on a different 
set of corporate governance guidelines (Koranteng, 2004). Nonetheless, the Ghana Stock 
Exchange and the Security Exchange Commission serve as the primary regulators of all listed 
companies ensuring that all listing requirements and regulations are adhered to while also 
ensuring that these companies adhere to good corporate governance measures. In this regard, 
emphasis must be placed on the effects good corporate governance has on firm performance 
to help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of listed firms. 
 
 
 
 
Corporate governance and Firm Performance  
The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1999), defines 
corporate governance as the mechanism or the system by which businesses and organisations 
are directed and controlled. The OECD indicates that the adoption of good corporate 
practices has the ability to increase and restore shareholder confidence as well as economic 
efficiency and growth (OECD, 2004). According to Sheikh and Rees (1995), the concept of 
corporate governance is grounded mainly in the accountability of directors to shareholders in 
lieu of their responsibilities in ensuring wealth maximisation. Corporate governance is a set 
of mechanisms that aims to direct managerial decisions and helps improve the firms' 
performance (Jarboui, Guetat, Boujelbene, 2015), while Vintila and Gherghina (2012) 
emphasised the fact that corporate governance mechanisms have the ability to mitigate the 
agency problem by aligning the interests of managers and directors with those of the 
shareholders. A number of previous studies investigated the role of governance mechanisms 
in resolving conflicts of interest between shareholder and managers and in improving 
performance (see e.g. Cubbin & Leech, 1983; Aydin, Sayim, &Yalama, 2007). However, the 
findings of these empirical studies are contradictory and inconclusive. The indecisive nature 
of the literature as it relates to whether there is any relationship existing between the firm 
performance and corporate governance is been operated calls for this paper. 
 
Board of Directors 
The key role of the board of directors is to monitor management decisions. Cadbury report 
(1992) identifies the board of directors’ responsibilities as setting the company’s strategic 
aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the 
business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship.  Boards of directors are typically 
measured by two characteristics: board composition and board size with either characteristic, 
there is a trade-off between more information and more effective decision-making. According 
to agency theory, non-executive directors can play key role in monitoring management 
performance. Having a higher proportion of outside non-executive directors on the board 
would result in better monitoring of the activities by the board and limit managerial 
opportunism (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus, it is expected that having more 
outside directors on the board will enhance the firm performance. Previous studies find 
relationship between board composition and profitability of firms in the sense that as the 
number of independent directors increased the higher the level of firm performance (Abor 
and Biekpe,2007) . These findings emphasise the need for non-executive directors. Chen et 
al., (2006) and Lo et al., (2010) added that greater board independence results in the 
reduction of fraudulent activities and the misappropriation of scare resources. As implied by 
resource dependence theory , non-executive directors with their expertise, knowledge, 
prestige and contacts, provide firms with links to external environment ( Wang and 
Hussainey, 2013). We expect a positive association between the number of non-executive 
directors and form performance. This lead to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: A positive association exists between number of non-executive directors and firm 
performance.  
 
It has been argued that larger boards result in high performance due to the increased 
opportunities arising from diversity - gender, level of experiences, skills, expertise and 
nationality, networking and planning previous studies have investigated the association 
between board size and firm performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Dalton and Dalton, 
2005;  Adam and Mehran, 2005). Earlier works on the relationship between board size and 
firm performance have often been attributed to Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993) who 
supports smaller boards as being more efficient than larger ones. Yermack (1996) examines 
large US firms from 1984 to 1991 and finds a strong negative effect of board size on Tobin’s 
q. Eisenberg et al.,  (1997) present evidence that a negative correlation between board size 
and profitability. In the same vein, Jensen (2012), found that keeping small boards can help to 
improve their performance and concludes that when board gets beyond seven or eight 
members they are less likely to function effectively. We expect that large board of directors 
leads to low performance. This lead to our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: A negative association exists between size of directors and firm performance.  
 
Van der Walt and Ingley (2003) define diversity in the context of corporate governance as the 
structure of the board and the combination of the different qualities, characteristics and 
expertise of the individual members in relation to decision-making and other processes within 
the board. The level of Board diversity affects their decisions and might also contribute to the 
discussion, exchange of ideas and performance of the group (Kang, Cheng and Grey, 2007). 
Gender diversity on board is a highly debated topic, which has received a tremendous amount 
of attention of policy makers, researchers and shareholders (Chapple and Humphrey 2014). 
Davies Report (2011) has offered a business case for increasing the number of women on 
corporate boards and its potential impact on performance. In fact, substantial research is 
epidemic in the women-on-boards and suggests that companies with a strong female 
representation at board and top management level perform better than those without. (e.g. 
Adams et al. 2009; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 2008; Farrell and Hersch 2005; Carter et al. 
2003; Erhardt et al. 2003). Hence, it is expected that more female directors on board will 
increase improve the firm performance. This lead to our third hypothesis:  
 
H3: A positive association exist between the presence of female on board of directors and 
firm performance 
 
Ownership Structure 
The ownership structure has the ability to shape the corporate governance system in any 
given country (Zhuang, 1999). The ownership structure is presented in terms of block holder 
ownership and state ownership.  Substantial shareholders are expected to have the power and 
incentive to monitor management. The level of concentration of the ownership structure has 
implications such as large shareholders dominating decision making to the detriment of small 
shareholders (Kuznetsov and Muravyev, 2001). In other words, companies with concentrated 
ownership have less agency problems (Alnajjar and Abed , 2014; Zhuang,1999). However, 
the influence of block holder ownership on firm performance has received mixed results. 
Previous studies examined the relationship between and performance and find positive 
relation exists between ownership concentration and profitability (Cubin & Leech,1983; Xu 
and Wang, 1999; Hiraki et al., 2003; Heugens et al., 2009 ). They show the important role of 
large shareholders and how the market value is positively related to increasing values of 
shares held by larger shareholders. Nevertheless, other stream of studies contradict this view 
and have emphasized another source of agency problem created by rising ownership 
concentration that gives more power to a circumscribed number of shareholders, that in turn 
might expropriate value from minority shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999). Similarly, Shah et al. (2012) demonstrating that an increase in the concentration levels 
of ownership structure leads to a reduction in good practises by firms. Nevertheless, we 
expect that block holder ownership led to high firm performance. This lead to our fourth 
hypothesis: 
 
H4: A positive association between block holder ownership and firm performance. 
 
The association between State ownership and firm performance has motivated many 
empirical studies. Porta et al. (1999) argue that the incentive for government to own shares in 
firm might be related to achieving political objectives rather than economic objectives.  On 
the other hand Eng and Mark (2003) clime that government ownership reduce the problems 
of asymmetric information that result from the imperfect information about the value of the 
company. However, the empirical evidence for the relationship between firm performance 
and state ownership has been mixed results. Some studies report a positive effect of 
government ownership on firm performance (e.g. Bos 1991; Jiang et al., 2008; Liao and 
Young, 2012), while other studies present a negative effect (Chen et al., 2005,  Wei, 2007; 
Mahmood and Abbas, 2011). Based on the above discussion we expect that State ownership 
lead to lower performance. This lead to our fifth hypothesis: 
 
H5: A negative association between State ownership and firm performance. 
 
Audit Committee  
The role of the Audit committee in most companies is to monitor the integrity of their 
financial statement as well as the announcements of financial performance. Okeahalam, 
(2004) added that it is the duty of the audit committee to bring to the notice of the board of 
directors all issues that require special attention. The size of the audit committee is 
considered to be relevant to the effective discharge of its duties (Cadbury Committee, 1992). 
A number of corporate governance reports mandates that audit committees consist of a 
minimum of four directors (e.g. BRC, 1999; New York Stock Exchange, 2002; CMA, 2006). 
It is argued that a larger committee has greater organizational status and authority and a wider 
knowledge base (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993; Braiotta, 2000). There are number of studies 
reported positive relationship between board size and firm performance (see. e.g. Dalton et 
al., 1999; Saleh et al., 2007; Mir & Souad, 2008). On the other hand, Vafeas (1999) suggest 
that larger audit committee can lead to inefficient governance, because of yielding frequent 
meetings, which leads to increased expenses, and therefore negatively affect firm 
performance. Thus, large audit committee board is more likely to result in low firm 
performance. This lead to our sixth hypothesis: 
 
H6: A negative association between audit committee size and firm performance. 
 
The frequency of Audit committee meeting is used in prior research to measure the 
effectiveness of audit meeting. It has been argued that inactive audit committees are unlikely 
to monitor management effectively (Menon and Williams, 1994). Saleh et al., (2007) argued 
that audit committee with a small number of meetings is less likely to possess good role of 
monitoring. Abbott et al. (2004) find that audit committees of firms restating their financial 
statements are not likely to meet at least four times a year.  A positive relationship was 
established between the frequency of audit committee meetings and firm performance (see 
e.g. Raghunandan and Rama,2007; Sharma et al., 2009). On the other hand, Rebeiz and 
Salameh (2006) found there is no relationship between audit committee meeting frequency 
and firm performance. Their finding was supported in research conducted by Sharma et al., 
(2009). Based on the above discussion we expect a positive association between the 
frequency of audit committee meeting and firm performance. This lead to our seventh 
hypothesis:  
H7: A positive relationship between frequency of audit committee meeting and firm 
performance 
 
Methodology and Data 
Data Description 
This study focuses on 20 of the 34 listed companies on the Ghana Stock Exchange across a 5 
year period (2008 to 2012). A purposive sample of at least one company from every industry 
on the Stock exchange was selected to enable a true representation of the entire population. 
The data set for the research was primarily secondary data consisting of longitudinal and 
cross-sectional data. The sources of data include annual reports and financial statements of 
the listed companies. Variables such as return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), net 
profits margin (NPM) and Tobin's Q (TBQ) were adopted. Director information and Board 
Structure, Board gender, Ownership and Corporate Control information was acquired from 
the websites and annual reports of the various companies with additional information also 
sought directly from the Ghana Stock Exchange. A pool panel regression and an ANOVA 
analysis was used to establish the presence or otherwise of a significant relationship between 
the dependent and independent variables while controlling for age ,size and leverage ratio of 
the firm. In this study, corporate governance structure was considered as the independent 
variable while corporate performance was taken to be the dependent variable. The study 
adopts four performance indicators to provide a deeper insight and basis of comparison. 
Tables 1.0 and 2.0 present the operational definitions adopted in the research. 
Table 1.0 Operational Definitions 
 NAME OF 
VARIABLES 
DESCRIPTION EFFECT ON FIRM 
PERFORMANCE 
  BOARD STRUCTURE  
1. Board Size. Total number of directors 
of the board. 
Positive or negative  
relationship between 
board size and firm 
performance. 
2. Board Independence. Number of independent directors in 
relation to total number of 
directors. 
Positive relationship with 
firm performance. 
 
3 Board Gender. Number of female directors on the 
board. 
 
 
 
Board diversity is 
supposed to 
have a positive effect on 
firm performance. 
  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE  
4 
 
 
5 
Top Twenty 
Shareholders. 
 
State Ownership. 
Ratio of shares held by the 
top twenty shareholders to the 
total shares outstanding. 
 
Ratio of state-owned 
shares to the total shares 
outstanding. 
Higher concentrated 
ownership results in a 
better firm performance. 
 
State owned firms 
perform more poorly than 
privately owned firms. 
  CORPORATE CONTROL  
6 
 
7 
Audit committee size. 
 
 
Frequency of Audit 
committee meetings. 
Number of members on the audit 
committee. 
 
Frequency of audit committee 
meetings held. 
An effective audit 
committee has a positive 
effect on firm 
performance. 
 
 
Table 2.0 Operational Definitions 
VARIABLE LABEL OPERATIONALIZATION 
Return on Equity ROE Net Profit/ Total Equity 
Return on Assets ROA Net Income/ Total Assets 
Net Profit Margin NPM Net Income/ Total Sales  
Tobin's Q TBQ (Market Size+ Total Asset- Total Equity)/ 
Total Assets 
 
Model 
The research adopts a model similar to that adopted by Abor and Biekpe (2007) who used 
firm performance as a function of board and ownership structure.  Their model was 
Performance = α + β (board) + δ (ownership) + K (control factors) + µ. However, the general 
panel regression model for analysing cross-sectional and time series data is adopted and 
further expanded to include all the indices covered in the study. 
Yit  = α + bx it +  εit 
Where 
Y = Dependent variables (ROA, ROE, NPM, Tobin’s Q) 
x = Independent variables (BS, BG, BI, TTS, SOS, FM, SAC, SZE, AGE, DBS) 
α and b = Coefficients 
i and t = cross-sectional and time-series dimensions 
ε = Error term 
The various models are defined as follows. 
1. ROA= α + βBS+ βBG+ βBI+ βΤTS+ βSOS +βFM+ βSAC+ βSZE+ βAGE+ 
βDBS+ ε 
2. ROE= α+ βBS+ βBG+ βBI+βΤTS+ βSOS+ βFM+ βSAC+ βSZE+ βAGE+ 
βDBS+ ε 
3. NPM = α + βBS+ βBG+ βBI+ βΤTS +βSOS+ βFM+ βSAC+ βSZE+ 
βAGE+ βDBS+ ε 
4. TBQ= α+ βBS+ βBG+ βBI+βΤTS+ βSOS+ βFM+ βSAC+ βSZE+ βAGE+ 
βDBS+ ε 
 
Where 
Y = Dependent variables (ROA, ROE, NPM, Tobin’s Q) 
x = Independent variables (BS, BG, BI, TTS, SOS, FM, SAC, SZE, AGE, DBS) 
α and b = Coefficients 
i and t = cross-sectional and time-series dimensions 
ε = Error term 
 
Findings 
VARIABLE MEAN MEDIAN STD DEV MIN MAX 
Board Size 9.095745 9 2.048179 6 14 
Executive Directors 3.071429 3 1.604104 1 7 
Non- Executive Directors 5.892857 5.5 1.735649 3 10 
Male 7.611111 7.5 1.752651 4 11 
Female (Board diversity) 1.455556 1 0.9848414 0 4 
Audit Committee Size 3.942857 4 1.08862 2 7 
Freq. of Audit Meetings 7.54 5.5 4.366898 1 15 
Top 20  share ownership 83.25756 86.68 10.36681 54.67 96.02 
State ownership 9.751495 0 17.69904 0 51.1 
AGE 45.7000 44 23.50607 17 117 
SZE 8.202602 8.179353 0.7013089 6.523828 9.535049 
DBS 0.7497971 0.7596479 0.6573081 0.1076564 6.868094 
ROA 5.553564 3.873085 7.942914 -13.44023 29.65137 
ROE -82.50871 18.13734 824.3728 -8069.237 59.73655 
NPM 11.41533 11.48242 15.43508 -37.21357 61.19115 
TOBIN'S Q 1.458058 1.120609 0.915152 0.099868 4.72146 
 
Table 4.1 reports an average/mean board size of nine board members amongst the 20 sampled 
companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange. The analysis also reveals that on average 
listed firms have three (3) internal board members (executive directors) and approximately 6 
external board members (non-executive directors). This implies that on average, there are 
more non-executive directors than executive directors, suggesting a high level of 
independence on the board which conforms to the Ghana Stock Exchange listing 
requirements of a minimum of four (4) non-executive directors on a company’s board. Also, 
the ratio of male board members to female board members was found to be 7:1 which implies 
that board diversity among listed firms is low. 
As shown in Table 4.1 on average, the top twenty shareholders hold about 83.26% of the 
company’s shares thus ownership is concentrated among a few shareholders. This result 
corroborates the findings of Salami (2011) who found that most of the listed companies on 
the Ghanaian stock exchange had very high ownership concentrations. The analysis also 
reveals that the state ownership on average is about 9.75% of total shares outstanding 
implying low government influence among listed firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange. The 
analysis on corporate control also indicates that on average, listed companies have 4 members 
on their audit committee ranging from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 7 and the audit 
committee held an average of 8 meetings annually, varying between 1 to 15 times in a year. 
Table 4.1 reports on some performance indicators of the sampled firms from the Ghana Stock 
Exchange. It shows that the average Return on Asset (ROA) was 5.55%, Return on Equity 
was -82.42%, Net profit Margin was 11.42% while Tobin’s Q was 1.458057%. Furthermore, 
the table also reports that the average age of the sampled companies was 45.7 years while the 
average firm size was 8.202602 with firm size indicated by the natural log of the firms’ 
capitalization. Finally, the average debt to equity ratio for the sampled companies was 
reported to be 0.7497971.  
Multicollinearity Test 
A multicollinearity test is conducted to ascertain whether the independent variables have a 
strong correlation among themselves. The test is important because the reliability of the 
results is questionable in the event of the existence of multicollinearity. All other things being 
equal, researchers desire higher levels of tolerance, as low levels of tolerance are known to 
adversely affect the results associated with a multiple regression analysis. Various 
recommendations for acceptable levels of tolerance have been published in the literature. 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), the minimum level of tolerance recommended is 
a value of 0.10 whereas Menard (1995) recommended the use of 0.20 as the minimum value 
and 0.25 by Huber and Stephens (1993).  
Table 4. 1: Variance Inflation Factor and Tolerance levels of Independent Variables 
Variable  VIF Tolerance level (1/VIF) 
BS  2.38 0.420075 
AGE  2.14 0.46716 
DBS  1.75 0.570689 
SIZE  1.70 0.589835 
SOS  1.68 0.594740 
TTS  1.67 0.598509 
BI  1.63 0.612415 
BG  1.48 0.674595 
SAC  1.43 0.744141 
Mean VIF  1.75  
Table 4.2 shows that the tolerance levels are all higher than the minimum recommended 
values and therefore implies that the level of correlation between the independent variables 
are small and will not increase the standard errors significantly. Therefore multicollinearity is 
not a problem in the models estimated below. 
Regression Results 
Table 4. 2: Regression Model (Dependent Variable: Return on Asset) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Prob. 
CONSTANT 14.39775 16.46431 0.87 0.386 
BS -.8893935 .7025447 -1.27 0.211 
BI -26.7383 10.13664 -2.64 0.011 
BG -.0897605 12.37466 -0.01 0.994 
FM -0.8197644 0.3666621 -2.24 0.032 
TTS .2893576 .1182329 2.45 0.018 
SOS .0834645 .1093657 0.76 0.449 
SAC .4786649 1.19128 0.40 0.690 
AGE .2082823 .0880447 2.37 0.022 
SIZE -1.96193 1.71972 -1.14 0.259 
DBS -1.666774 1.633173 -1.02 0.312 
     
R – squared 0.4221  F – Statistic 2.34 
Adj. R – squared 0.2415  Prob. (p-value) 0.0335 
Table 4.3 indicates that Board size (BS) has a negative but insignificant relationship with 
ROA. The negative association suggests that companies with a relatively lower board size 
tend to perform better with regards to ROA than companies with a larger board size. The 
findings of the negative association consolidates the findings in Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
and Jensen (1993) who concluded that smaller boards are more efficient as against larger 
boards. The regression results also reveal a (p<0.05) significant negative (-26.7383) 
relationship between board independence and ROA. This suggests that listed companies with 
a relatively lower number of non-executive directors tends to perform better in terms of ROA 
than companies with a larger percentage of non-executive directors. This result contradicts 
Abor and Biekpe (2007) who found a significant positive relationship between board 
independence and firm profitability. 
Table 4.3 revealed that Board gender (BG) has a negative but insignificant impact on ROA. It 
also shows that the number of times audit committee meetings were held had an influence on 
performance as given by the p-value of 0.032. Thus the number of times audit meetings were 
held in a firm negatively affected ROA. The number of members on the audit committee does 
not have a significant impact on ROA at a 5% level of confidence as its p-value was 0.690. 
Results on the impact of ownership structure on performance are also presented in the table 
above. The proportion of shares held by the top 20 shareholders has a positive and significant 
impact on Return on Assets (ROA) at the 5% level of confidence. This result agrees with 
Zhuang (1999) who indicates that companies with higher concentrated ownership structures 
perform better than their counterparts. Ratio of state owned shares to total shares outstanding 
(SOS) however has a positive but insignificant impact on ROA as its p-value was 0.449.  
Table 4. 3: Regression Model (Dependent Variable: Return on Equity) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Prob. 
CONSTANT -29.88866 35.37073 -0.85 0.402 
BS -1.757584 1.509296 -1.16 0.250 
BI -48.55246 21.77682 -2.23 0.030 
BG 23.5524 26.58483 0.89 0.380 
FM -2.146939 0.735061 -2.92 0.006 
TTS .2483074 .2540031 0.98 0.333 
SOS .3348998 .2349533 1.43 0.160 
SAC 1.919521 2.559275 0.75 0.457 
AGE .2249509 .1891489 1.19 0.240 
SIZE 6.75072 3.694522 1.83 0.044 
DBS -4.452213 3.50859 -1.27 0.210 
 
R-squared  0.4436  F-Statistic 2.55 
Adj. R-squared  0.2698  Prob. (p-value) 0.0216 
On the impact of board composition on performance, results in Table 4.4 indicates that board 
independence (BI) to has a negative and significant impact on Return on Equity as its p-value 
of 0.030 is less than the 5% level of confidence. This suggests that a unit increase in the 
number of non-executives would negatively impact on ROE. Results also suggest a negative 
relationship between Board size (BS) and ROE but this relation according to Table 4.4 was 
insignificant as its p-value was 0.250 which is higher than the 5% level of confidence. Board 
gender or the proportion of female board members does have a positive but insignificant 
impact on Return on Equity. Table 4.4 also reports on the impact of corporate control on firm 
performance. The number of times companies hold audit meetings is shown by Table 4.4 to 
have a negative and significant influence on Return on Equity. Findings indicate that the 
number of members on the audit committee (SAC) does not significantly influence Return on 
Equity as its p-value lies above the 5% level of confidence. With respect to the impact of 
ownership structure on performance, Table 4.4 indicates that the ratio or percentage of shares 
held by the top 20 shareholders to the total shares outstanding does have a positive but 
insignificant impact on Return on Equity as its p-value (0.333) lies above the 5% level of 
confidence. Also the ratio of state-owned shares to the total shares outstanding does not have 
a significant influence on Return on Equity. 
Table 4. 4: Regression Model (Dependent Variable: Net Profit Margin) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Prob. 
CONSTANT     
BS -1.638836    1.001218     -1.64    0.108     
BI -12.38133    14.44603     -0.86    0.395 
BG 36.65193    17.63551      2.08    0.043 
FM -0.6248072 0.5239308 -1.19 0.242 
TTS 0.1378722    .1684973      0.82    0.417     
SOS -.2422159    .1558603     -1.55    0.126     
SAC 3.277553    1.697739      1.93    0.059     
AGE 0.241896    .1254752      1.93    0.049      
SIZE 11.90848    2.450825      4.86    0.000      
DBS -0.0792751    2.327484     0.03    0.973     
  
R – squared 0.5573  F – Statistic 4.03 
Adj. R – squared 0.4189  Prob.(p-value) 0.0012 
Table 4.5 presents the regression model with Net Profit Margin as the dependent variable and 
the explanatory variables use in the previous models. With respect to the impact of the board 
composition on performance, results in Table 4.5 indicate board size to have a negative but 
insignificant impact on Net Profit Margin of the sampled firms. Unlike findings in our 
previous models where board independence had a significant impact on performance, board 
independence has a negative but insignificant impact on Net Profit Margin. Board Gender 
(board diversity) however, is shown to have a positive and a significant influence on Net 
Profit Margin. The positive relation between board gender and performance (Net Profit 
Margin) conforms with the findings of Fondas and Sassalos (2000) and Carter et al. (2003). 
The number of audit meetings held shows no significant influence on performance (NPM) 
since the p-value was 0.242. The coefficient of the number of members on the audit 
committee is 3.277553 and its p-value is 0.059, this suggests that the size of audit committee 
does not influence Net Profit Margin at the 5% level of confidence. Considering the impact of 
ownership structure on performance, Table 4.5 reports that the proportion of outstanding 
shares held by the top twenty shareholders has a positive but insignificant influence on Net 
Profit Margin. The positive relation supports the findings of Zhuang (1999) who asserted that 
high level of ownership concentration are more effective in monitoring the activities of 
management. On the other hand, the proportion of outstanding shares held by the state has 
been shown to have a negative but insignificant impact on Net Profit Margin.  
Table 4. 5: Regression Model (Dependent Variable: Tobin’s q) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Prob. 
CONSTANT 0.5363313 1.970829 0.27 0.787 
BS -0.0602522  0.0843653 -0.71 0.479 
BI -0.473477  1.198990 -0.39 0.695 
BG 2.410052 1.503104 1.60 0.115 
FM -0.0863936 0.048234 -1.79 0.083 
TTS 0.0303281 0.013961 2.17 0.035 
SOS -0.0115636  0.0131307 -0.88 0.383 
SAC -0.1010056  0.1482196 -0.68 0.499 
AGE 0.0276022  0.0115537 2.39 0.021 
SIZE -0.2095559  0.2041168 -1.03 0.310 
DBS 0.0529347  0.1954531 0.27 0.788 
 R – squared  0.2451  F – Statistic 2.73 
Adj. R –squared  0.1036  Prob.(p-value) 0.047 
Table 4.6 presents the regression model with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable and the 
same independent variables use in the previous models. Table 4.6 indicate board size to have 
a negative but insignificant impact on Tobin’s Q of the sampled firms. Board independence 
has a negative but insignificant impact on Tobin’s Q. Board Gender (board diversity) is 
shown to have a positive and insignificant influence on Tobin’s Q. Also the number of audit 
meetings does not have a significant impact on Tobin’s Q at the 5% level of confidence. 
Table 4.6 also reports the coefficient of the number of member on the audit committee as 
having a negative but insignificant impact on Tobin’s Q as its p-value was 0.499 suggesting 
that the size of audit committee does not influence Tobin’s Q at the 5% level of confidence. 
In terms of ownership structure the proportion of outstanding shares held by the top twenty 
percent of shareholders has a positive and a significant influence on Tobin’s Q. The positive 
relationship supports the findings of Zhuang (1999) who asserted that high level of ownership 
concentration increases shareholder effectiveness in monitoring the activities of management. 
However, the proportion of outstanding shares held by the state has been shown to have a 
negative but insignificant impact on Tobin’s Q.  
4.4.1 ANOVA ANALYSIS OF BOARD SIZE 
Table 4. 6: The impact of Board size on ROA, ROE, NPM and Tobin’s Q 
BS Freq.  Mean 
(ROA) 
Mean 
(ROE) 
Mean 
(NPM)  
Mean 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Less than 8 40 6.12208 17.0629 14.0962 1.5258 
9 to 11 41 5.77912 21.8297 12.6373 1.34296 
Greater than 11 19 3.86995 -517.284 3.13437 1.54896 
F- Statistic  1.20 1.66 2.08 1.12 
P-Value  0.3104 0.1194 0.0467 0.3619 
Table 4.7 presents the ANOVA results for the impact of board size on ROA, ROE, NPM and 
Tobin’s Q. The sampled companies have been classified into three groups. As shown above, 
companies with a board size of less than 8 members had an average ROA of 6.12208, those 
with a board size from 9 to 11 had an average ROA of 5.77912 and those with a board size 
greater than 11 had an ROA of 3.86995. This suggests that companies with a relatively 
smaller board size tend to perform better than companies with a relatively larger size. 
However with an F-Statistic value of 1.20 and a P-value of 0.3104, we conclude that there is 
no significant difference between the mean ROA for companies with different board sizes. 
Thus, board size does not have a significant impact on ROA. Board size also showed no 
significant impact on ROE having recorded an F-statistic value of 1.66 and a p-value of 
0.1194. Companies within the first group (Less than 8 board members) had an average ROE 
of 17.0629, with those in the second group (9-11 board members) recording an average ROE 
of 21.8297 and an average ROE of -517.284 for those in the third group (board members 
greater than 11). 
Table 4.7 also presents results on the impact of board size on NPM and Tobin’s Q. NPM was 
14.0962 for a board size of 8 members and less, this decreased slightly to 12.6373 when the 
board size increased to 9 to 11 members. There was a further decrease to 3.13437 as the 
board size increased to 11 members and more. The F-statistic value of 2.08 and a P-value of 
0.0467 indicate a significant impact of the size of the board on NPM. There was however no 
clear pattern discovered in the results of the Tobin’s Q. The first group (less than 8 members) 
recorded a Tobin’s Q of 1.5258, while Tobin’s Q for the second group (9-11 members) was 
1.34296, increasing to 1.54896 for the above 11 board members group .Given a p-value of 
0.3619, the impact of board size on Tobin’s Q was concluded to be insignificant. 
 
4.4.2 ANOVA ANALYSIS OF BOARD INDEPENDENCE 
Table 4. 7: Impact of Board Independence on ROA, ROE, NPM and Tobin’s Q 
BI Freq.  Mean 
(ROA) 
Mean 
(ROE) 
Mean 
(NPM)  
Mean 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Less than 5 42 7.46858 21.3462 16.791 1.69076 
6 to 8 37 4.05727 15.0776 11.6835 1.28716 
Greater than 8 21 4.35987 -462.156 0.191599 1.69076 
F- Statistic  1.29 4.99 3.14 1.10 
P-Value  0.2683 0.0001 0.0058 0.3735 
Table 4.8 above presents the ANOVA test for the impact of board independence on ROA, 
ROE, NPM and Tobin’s Q. The ANOVA test was used to compare the averages of the four 
firm performance indicators based on the number of independent board members. Board 
Independence was classified under 3 groups with the first group having less than 5 non- 
executive members, second group with 6 to 8 non-executive members and the last group with 
more than 8 non-executive members. From the analysis, it can be inferred that the group with 
a relatively smaller number of non-executive directors performed better than companies with 
a relatively larger number of non-executive directors as depicted by the ROE of 21.3462 and 
NPM of 16.791 being the highest values. Mixed results were however discovered for the 
impact of board independence on the performance indicators. The p-value for ROE and NPM 
was 0.0001 and 0.0058 respectively implying that there is a significant impact of board 
independence on both ROE and NPM. However, no significant impact was recorded for ROA 
and Tobin’s Q as their P-values of 0.2683 and 0.3735 were above the 5% acceptable error 
margin. 
4.4.3 ANOVA ANALYSIS OF BOARD GENDER 
Table 4. 8: Impact of Board Gender on ROA, ROE, NPM and Tobin’s Q 
BG Freq.  Mean 
(ROA) 
Mean 
(ROE) 
Mean 
(NPM)  
Mean 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Less than 2 78 5.05963 -3.92852 11.0336 1.40306 
Greater than 2 22 7.30478 -361.111 12.7687 1.67498 
F- Statistic  1.24 0.30 1.81 0.8 
P-Value  0.3017 0.8756 0.1339 0.5269 
Table 4.9 reports on the impact of board diversity (BG) on firm performance. For this section 
only 2 classifications were used. The first group was made up of boards with less than 2 
female directors while the second group was made up of boards with more than 2 female 
directors represented the second group. An increase in performance was identified for ROA, 
NPM and Tobin’s Q as the number of females on the board became greater than 2, this was 
however not the case with ROE as the first group had an ROE of -3.9852, there was a further 
decrease to -361.111. Regardless of the above inferences, the P-values of ROA, ROE, NPM 
and Tobin’s Q were 0.3017, 0.8756, 0.1339 and 0.5269 respectively indicating that there is 
no significant impact of the board gender diversity on performance.  
4.4.4 ANOVA ANALYSIS OF TOP TWENTY OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Table 4. 9: Impact of top twenty percent ownership on performance 
TTS Freq. Mean 
(ROA) 
Mean 
(ROE) 
Mean 
(NPM) 
Mean 
(Tobin’s q) 
Less than 60 5 2.72979 4.23032 1.86201 1.04668 
60 to 80 30 5.76351 15.943 10.7136 1.4644 
Greater than 80 65 5.67388 -134.62 12.4741 1.49162 
F-statistic  1.00 0.49 1.70 1.21 
p-value  0.4830 0.9802 0.0423 0.2752 
Table 4.10 presents the ANOVA analysis on the impact of the proportion of outstanding 
shares owned by the top twenty percent of shareholders on the firm’s performance. The 
sampled companies were group into three and their average performance in terms of ROA, 
ROE, NPM and Tobin’s Q. The ANOVA test reports an F-statistic of 1.00 with a p-value of 
0.4830 by comparing the average ROA for the three groups. This implies no significant 
difference in ROA for the three groups and hence we conclude that the percentage of top 
twenty ownership does not have a significant impact on ROA. Similar results were 
discovered for ROE and Tobin’s Q as their P- values were 0.9802 and 0.2752 respectively. 
Contrary to the findings above, the ANOVA test reported an F-statistic of 1.70 with a p-value 
of 0.0423 by comparing the average NPM for the three groups. This therefore implies 
significant difference in NPM for the three groups and hence the conclusion that the 
proportion of outstanding shares owned by the top twenty percent of shareholders does have a 
significant impact on NPM at the 5% level of confidence. 
4.4.5 ANOVA ANALYSIS OF STATE OWNERSHIP 
Table 4. 10: Impact of the share of State ownership on Performance 
SOS Freq. Mean 
(ROA) 
Mean 
(ROE) 
Mean 
(NPM) 
Mean 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Less than 20 74 6.67593 18.8962 14.2875 1.61374 
20 to 40 16 3.04625 -79.1616 7.85701 1.10631 
Greater than 40 10 1.2598 -838.26 -4.14568 0.976279 
F-statistic  2.24 6.50 4.45 1.23 
p-value  0.0462 0.0000 0.0005 0.3001 
Table 4.11 presents the ANOVA analysis on the impact of the proportion of outstanding 
shares owned by the State on the firm performance. The sample companies were group into 
three and their average performance in terms of ROA, ROE, NPM and Tobin’s Q were 
compared. The analysis revealed that a unit increase of state ownership in a firm, results in a 
reduction in firm performance. This was confirmed as the first group of companies with less 
than 20% state ownership performed relatively better than the firms with state ownership 
greater than 40%. The ANOVA test reported an F-statistic of 2.24 with a p-value of 0.0462 
by comparing the average ROA for the three groups. This revealed a significant difference in 
ROA for the three groups and hence the conclusion that state ownership can affect ROA. This 
result is synonymous to that of ROE and NPM were p-values of 0.0000 and 0.0005 
respectively were recorded signifying an impact of the share of state ownership on these 
variables. With Tobin’s Q, the ANOVA test reported an F-statistic of 1.23 with a p-value of 
0.3001 by comparing the average Tobin’s Q for the three groups. This suggests that state 
ownership has no significant impact on Tobin’s Q. 
 
 
4.4.6 ANOVA ANALYSIS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE SIZE 
Table 4. 11: Impact of Audit committee size on ROA, ROE, NPM and Tobin’s Q 
SAC Freq. Mean 
(ROA) 
Mean 
(ROE) 
Mean 
(NPM) 
Mean 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Less than 3 27 3.78484 13.8149 9.82241 1.53069 
Greater than 3  73 6.20775 -118.135 12.0045 1.42808 
F-statistic  3.53 2.94 1.80 1.54 
p-value  0.0070 0.0190 0.1249 0.1913 
Table 4.12 presents the ANOVA analysis of the impact of the audit committee size on firm 
performance. The sample companies were grouped into two and their average performance in 
terms of ROA, ROE, NPM and Tobin’s Q reviewed. The ANOVA test reports an F-statistic 
of 3.53 with a p-value of 0.00070 by comparing the average ROA for the two groups. This 
implies a significant difference in ROA for both groups thus concluding the presence of a 
significant impact on the firm’s ROA. This implies that companies with a larger audit size 
tend to perform better than companies with a smaller size. The ROE yielded the same results 
after a comparison of the averages of the two groups. The F-statistics and p-value were 2.94 
and 0.0190 respectively. This therefore implies that the size of the audit committee has a 
significant impact on ROE.  Contrary to the findings of ROA and ROE,  our results indicates 
that the audit committee size does not have significant impact on both NPM and Tobin’s Q as 
the F-statistics were reported to be 1.80 and 1.54 respectively and their p-values were 0.1249 
and 0.1913 respectively. 
 
4.4.7 ANOVA ANALYSIS OF THE FREQUENCY OF AUDIT COMMITTEE 
MEETINGS 
Table 4. 12: Impact of Frequency of Audit committee meetings on ROA, ROE, NPM 
and Tobin’s Q 
FM Freq.  Mean 
(ROA) 
Mean 
(ROE) 
Mean 
(NPM)  
Mean 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Less than 5 25 7.90381 18.7373 13.0403 1.87772 
5 to 10 4 -0.06698 -2004.73 9.07691 0.824669 
Greater than 10 71 5.90381 -9.86464 10.9749 1.33448 
F- Statistic  3.24 11393.65 2.94 3.03 
P-Value  0.0039 0.0000 0.0076 0.0068 
Table 4.13 compares the average ROA, ROE, NPM and Tobin’s Q for firms based on how 
frequently audit meetings are held. The frequency of Audit meetings were put into 3 groups , 
the first being less than 5 meetings a year, second group being between 5 to 10 meetings and 
the last group having more than 10 meetings. The average ROA for firms with less than 5 
meetings per year was 7.90381, firms who held 6 – 10 meetings was -0.06698 and 5.90381 
for firms who held more than 10 audit meetings. The F-statistic was 3.24 with p-value of 
0.0039, indicating that the frequency of audit committee meetings has a significant impact on 
firm performance (ROA). The remaining performance indicators ROE, NPM and Tobin’s Q 
yield the same results as did ROA. Their p-values were 0.0000, 0.0076 and 0.0068 
respectively indicating that the number of meetings held by the audit committee has a 
significant impact on firm performance. 
4.4.8 ANOVA ANALYSIS OF FIRM AGE 
Table 4. 13: Impact of Age on Performance 
AGE Freq. Mean 
(ROA) 
Mean 
(ROE) 
Mean 
(NPM) 
Mean 
(Tobin’s q) 
Less than 50 60 4.4551 -150.655 10.0862 1.3268 
50 to 80 30 7.29171 16.6691 8.5345 1.68172 
Greater than 80 10 6.92993 28.8385 28.0324 1.4992 
F-statistic  5.39 1.04 20.82 3.17 
p-value  0.0000 0.4176 0.0000 0.0011 
Table 4.14 presents the ANOVA results of the comparison of the average performance of the 
sampled companies. The age of the firm are classified into three groups. The results as shown 
in Table 4.13 indicate that the age of firms have a significant impact on ROA, NPM and 
Tobin’s Q as their respective p-values are less than the 5% level of confidence. The impact of 
firm age on ROE was however insignificant as its p-value was 0.4176 which lies above the 
5% level of confidence.  
 
4.4.9 ANOVA ANALYSIS OF FIRM SIZE 
Table 4. 14: Impact of firm size on performance 
SAC Freq. Mean 
(ROA) 
Mean 
(ROE) 
Mean 
(NPM) 
Mean 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Less than 8 68 6.77953 -132.305 4.71675 1.58241 
Greater than 8  32 2.96751 23.3094 25.6498 1.22539 
F-statistic  1.91 0.41 22.89 1.70 
p-value  0.1336 0.7447 0.0000 0.1737 
Table 4.15 presents the ANOVA test results for the sampled companies put into two groups 
based on their size. Size was computed by taking the natural log of the firms’ total assets. The 
results indicates that firm size does not have a significant impact on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s 
Q as their respective p-values lies above the 5% level of confidence. Table 4.14 however also 
shows that size of firm has a significant impact on NPM as its p-value was 0.0000. 
4.4.10 ANOVA ANALYSIS OF FIRM’S DEBT TO ASSET RATIO  
Table 4. 15: Impact of debt to equity ratio on performance 
DBS Freq. Mean 
(ROA) 
Mean 
(ROE) 
Mean 
(NPM) 
Mean 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Less than 3 89 5.6026 -83.3574 11.509 1.46189 
Greater than 3  11 0.699382 1.51478 2.14347 1.12061 
F-statistic  14.15 0.18 0.40 7.75 
p-value  0.0000 0.8327 0.6744 0.0008 
 
Table 4.16 also reports results for the impact of debt to equity ratio on performance. Table 
4.16 shows the F-statistics and their respective p-values for the performance indicators. And 
from these results, debt to equity ratio has a significant impact on ROA and Tobin’s Q as 
their respective p-values lie below the 5% level of confidence. However, debt to equity ratio 
has no significant impact on ROA and NPM. 
 
Discussion  
The first hypothesis (H1) suggests that there predict positive relationship 
between the number of independence and firm performance. The findings 
revealed a negative relationship between board independence and all the 
performance indicators. This implies that the performance of firms tends to 
decrease as the number of non-executive directors increased in relation to the 
executive directors. Therefore, the hypothesis is rejected. Our finding is 
consistent with previous studies (see.e.g Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001; 
Agrawal & Knoeber,1996; Azez, 2015), and conclude that outsiders on the 
board does not help performance. While on the other hand, this is contrary to 
findings of studies such as Black et al. (2006); Abor and Biekpe (2007) and 
Chen et al., 2006. However, given the context of Ghana this raise the question 
of whether the non-executive directors truly fulfil the non-executive directors 
characteristics which recommended by the best practice code. The second 
hypothesis (H2) predicted that board size would negatively associated with the 
firm performance. Contrary to H2 the result show insignificant relationship 
implying that board size does not predict firm performance. Therefore, H2 is not 
supported. This result is in contrast with Ujunwa (2012) who asserted that board 
size has a significant negative relationship with firm performance. One possible 
explanation could be due to the sample size. It is more likely that in small 
samples where the majority of firms consisted of similar number of total 
number of directors, the results would not highlight the influence of board size.  
The third hypothesis  (H3) suggests that the number of female directors on the 
board is positively associated with the performance. Our result revealed a 
positive and significant relationship with NPM which supports existing 
literature.  This suggests that a unit increase in the number of females on the 
board of directors would result in increased profitability.  However, a positive 
but insignificant relationship was established for both ROE and Tobin’s Q.The 
fourth hypothesis (H4) suggests a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and profitability. The results revealed a positive relationship with 
firm performance. There is strong evidence that the direct effect of ownership 
concentration on firm profitability in Ghana is positively and statistically 
significant, for ROA and Tobin’s Q. Thus, we find evidence in support of 
Hypothesis (4). This finding suggest that companies with a higher ownership 
concentration amongst the top twenty shareholders performed better than 
companies with lower ownership concentration. This result confirms the finding 
of previous studies (see e.g. Zhuang,1999; Hiraki et al., 2003; Heugens et al., 
2009) who also asserted that companies with higher ownership concentration 
performed better. Moreover, the result for State ownership shows that there is 
no association with firm performance, thus, H5 is rejected. This finding is 
consist with the result of Xu and Wang (1999) who conclude that State 
ownership is considered irrelevant to the company profitability. Our finding did 
not find support H6 as the result indicates no relationship between audit 
committee size and company performance. Our result is consistent with 
previous studies (Rebeiz and Salameh, 2006; Sharma et al., 2009 Al-Mamun, 
2014). Hypnosis 7 predicts that the number of audit comment meeting would be 
positively associated with firm performance. Contrary to H7, the result showed 
a significant negative relationship between number of audit committee meetings 
and ROE and ROA. The result in consistent with (Menon and Williams, 1994). 
This could be due to the increased costs for holding frequent meetings as well as 
the reverse in changes of decision taken in earlier meetings (Al-Mamun, 2014).  
 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Corporate Governance has been identified as a very intense and controversial area aspect of 
the business administration literature. The increasing need to understand the relationship 
between governance and firm performance is therefore of the essence (Kraus and 
Britzelmaier 2011). This study examined the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance of listed firms in Ghana. The corporate governance indicators used for this 
study included board size, board independence, board gender, ownership structure and 
effective audit committee. We demonstrated a mixed result in terms of the impact of 
corporate governance on firm performance. This in our view demonstrates the need not only 
for a uniform corporate governance code for companies operating in an emerging market  but 
also the need for company specific approaches based on good governance practice. Across all 
the indicators used, our results demonstrate an overwhelming support for the impact of good 
corporate governance on firm performance. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
A major limitation of the study is that data used is predominately collected from annual 
reports and thus may not be a true reflection of the state of affairs of the company since the 
regulatory and monitoring framework may be considered to be weaker in emerging markets 
than in matured markets. In addition, data used for the study covered a period of 5 years from 
2008 to 2012 due to gaps in the data set outside of this range. We are of the view that a study 
covering a wider period could improve the quality of results generated. While we established 
a relationship between corporate governance and firm performance using companies across a 
range of industrial sectors, an industry based analysis of firms on the Ghanaian Stock 
Exchange, examining the relationship between director and board composition, ownership 
structure and corporate control would provide deeper insights into the specific impact 
corporate governance has on various industries based on their peculiar characteristics and 
operations. This was however not possible due to the small number of listed firms on the 
exchange. Increasing the number of variables explored by studying the impact CEO tenure 
and duality, board equity ownership, executive compensation and remuneration committees 
on performance, would no doubt increase the validity of the established relationship between 
good corporate governance and firm performance. Finally, due to missing data for some firms 
listed on the exchange, our study could not include all the listed firms on the exchange in our 
sample 
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